I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1.
In its Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1 this Court observed that "[t]he destructive power of nuclear weapons cannat be contained in either space or time" and that such weapons "have the potential to destroy ali civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet". 2 It acknowledged "the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in parti cul ar the ir destructive capacity, their~capacity to cause untold human suffering, and the ir ability to cause damage to generations to come" . 3 Largely based on its analysis of Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons 4 (hereafter "the Treaty" or "the NPT"), the Court unanimously concluded: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations 1eading to nuclear disarmament in ali its aspects under strict and effective international control". 2. This Application is not an attempt tore-open the question of the legality of nuclear weapons. Rather, the focus of this Application is the failure to fulfil the obligations of customary international law with respect to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an earl y date and nuclear disarmament enshrined in Article VI of the NPT and declared by the Court.
3.
Unless the required negotiations, aimed at reaching the required conclusions, take place, we shall continue to face the very real prospect of the "devastation that would be visited upon ali mankind by a nuclear war". 6 We shall also continue to face the possibility, even the likelihood, ofnuclearweapons being used by accident, miscalculation or design, 7 and oftheir proliferation. As Nobel Peace Laureate Sir Joseph Rotblat pointed out: "If sorne nations-1 I C.J Reports 1996, p. 226. 2 Id., para. 35. 3 Id., para. 36. 4 729 UNTS 161.
5 Supra, n. 1, para. 105, point 2F.
6 NPT preamble. znd recital.
7 ln 1996 Lord Carver, former UK Chief of the Defence Staff(the professiona1 head of the UK's anned forces and the principal military adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence and to the UK Government) stated that "the indefinite deployment ofnnclear weapons carries a high risk oftheir ultimate use-intentionally, by accident or inadvertence". See Hansard, HL Deb, 28 October 1996, voL 575, cols. 134.
including the most powerful militari! y -say that they need nuclear weapons for the ir security, then such security cannot be denied to other countries which really fee! insecure. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is the logical consequence of this nuèlear po licy". 4.
In its Advisory Opinion, the Court observed: "In the long run, international law, and with it the stability of the international order which it is intended to govern, are bound to suffer from the continuing difference ofviews with regard to the legal status ofweapons as deadly as nuclear weapons" . 9 A coherent legal system cannot countenance its own destruction or that of the community whose activities it seeks to regulate. 10 That is why fulfilment of the obligation "to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in ail its aspects under strict and effective international control" is so important.
5.
Equally, a coherent and civilized legal system cannot tolerate unacceptable harm to humanity. A lawful and sustainable world order is predicated on a civilizational right to survival rooted in "the princip les ofhumanity" 11 and "elementary considerations ofhumanity" 12 which help to shape an emerging "law ofhumanity", 13 the international law for humank:ind of which the nuclear disarmament obligation is a key element. Y et it is now 68 years since the very 9 Supra, n. 1, para. 98.
10 As B.S. Chimni has stated, "No legal system can confer on any ofits members the right to annihilate the community which engenders it and whose activities it seeks to regulate". B.S. 6. Inspired and guided by these princip les and values, this is an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic oflndia ("India"), aState possessing nuclear weapons not party to the NPT. The underlying claims, described in more detail herein, are that India is: (i) in continuing breach of its obligations under customary international law, including specifically its obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations to cease the nuclear arms race at an early date, as well asto pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in ali its aspects under.strict and effective international control; and (ii) in continuing breach ofits obligation to perform its international legal obligations in good faith.
7.
The Applicant herein is the Republic of the Marshall Islands (the "Marshall Islands" or "RMI"). The Applicant is a non-nuclear-weapon State ("NNWS") Party to the NPT. The Marshall Islands acceded to the Treaty as a Party on 30 January 1995, and has continued to be a Party to it since that time.
8.
While cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are vitally important objectives for the entire international community, the Marshall Islands has a particular awareness of the dire consequences ofnuclear weapons. The Marshall Islands was the location ofrepeated nuclear weapons testing from 1946 to 1958, during the time that the international community had placed it under the trusteeship of the United States ("U.S."). 16 During those 12 years, 67 nuclear weapons ofvarying explosive power were detonated in the Marshall Islands, at varying distances from human population. in an increased global understanding of the movement of radionuclides through marine and terrestrial environments", and urges the international community to "learn from the Marshallese experience with nuclear contamination, particularly the ... understanding of the relationship between radioiodine and thyroid cancer".
19
9. With regard to the RMI's interest in bringing this Application to the Court, the following should be added. It is weil known that over recent years the RMI has been preoccupied with combating the extremely harmful consequences thal the effects of climate change have for its very survivaL While focusing on the problem of climate change, the RMI has come to realize that it cannot ignore the other major threat to its survival: the ongoing threat posed by the existence of large arsenals ofnuclear weapons the use ofwhich, according to the Court, "seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for [ ... ] requirements [of the principles and ru les of law applicable in arrned conflict]"? 0 It is obvions that the RMI's participation in the common struggle against climate change needs to lead to firrn commitments by ali States, which commitments must include not only moral, but also legal obligations aimed at realizing concrete, clear-cut goals in order to rem ove the threat of devastation caused by continued re lian ce on the use of fossil fuel energy sources. It is from this perspective of striving to reach agreement on such commitments in the struggle against climate change that the RMI has concluded thal it is no longer acceptable simply to be a Party to the NPT while total nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI and customary international law remains at best a distant prospect. This Application seeks to ensure that India fulfils in good faith and in a timely manner ali its legal obligations in relation to cessation of the nuclear arrns race and to nuclear disarmament.
O.
One of the reasons wh y the RMI became a Party to the NPT is thal this Treaty is the key instrument ofthe international community for ridding the world ofnuclear weapons.
21
Article VI of the Treaty states, in its entirety, as follows:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarrnament under strict and effective international controL 22 
11.
As previously stated, the Court concluded its Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 by 19 Id., para. 66(b ). unanimously holding that " [t] here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".
23
12.
More than four decades after the NPT entered into force, India has not joined the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and instead has tested nuclear weapons and acquired a nuclear arsenal which it is maintaining, improving, diversifying, and expanding.
13.
India has not fulfilled its obligation under customary international law to pursue in good faith negotiations to cease the nuclear arms race at an early date, and instead is taking actions to improve and expand its nuclear forces and to maintain them for the indefinite future.
14.
Simi1arly, India has not fulfilled its obligation under customary international law to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, in parti cul ar by engaging a course of conduct, the quantitative build-up and qualitative improvement of its nuclear forces, contrary to the objective of nuclear disarmament.
15.
Further, the obligation of aState to perform its legal obligations in good faith, whether arising under a treaty or pursuant to customary international law, is itself a legal obligation that India has breached.
II. FACTS
A.
The Five Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the NPT 16. The U.S. was the first country in the world to develop and test nuclear weapons. The U.S. used nuclear weapons in warfare on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 August 1945 and 9 August 1945 respectively. The U.S. was the sole possessor ofnuclear weapons in the world untilthe Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon on August 29, 1949.
In 1952, the UK tested its first nuclear weapon. In 1960, France tested its first nuclear weapon. In 1964, China tested its first nuclear weapon.
17.
In the 1960s, negotiations eventuated in agreement on the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. The U.S., Russia, the UK, France and China, ali Parties to the NPT, are the only States meeting the Treaty's definition of a "nuclear-weapon State" for "the purposes of this T reaty". 24 
18.
The Treaty was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970.
B.
The Ni ne States Possessing N uclear Weapons
19.
In addition to the five NPT nuclear-weapon States, four non-NPT States are known to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratie People's Republic ofKorea ("DPRK"). 25 
20.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ("SIPRI"), the individual and collective world nuclear forces as of January 2013, were as follows: 24 Article IX.3 of the NPT provides: "For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive deviee prior to 1 January " 'Deployed' means warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces. 6 These are warheads in reserve, awaiting dismantlement or that require sorne preparation (e.g., assembly
or loading on launchers) before they become full y operationally available. 'In addition to strategie warheads, this figure includes nearly 200 non-strategie (tactical) nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. C. India and the Nuclear Arms Race 
3.
Nuclear Policy, Doctrine, and Expenditure
24.
India has stated: "Nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national security and will remain so, pending the global elimination of al! nuclear weapons on a universal, nondiscriminatory basis" _3 6 25.
According to a 2003 statement of the govemment of India conceming a cabinet comrnittee review of nuclear doctrine, "nuclear weapons will on! y be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on In di an territory or on In di an forces anywhere", and su ch "retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage".
37 The statement also says:
"However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, In dia will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons".
38
26.
Re garding the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), In dia is one of the 44 Annex II countries thal must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force.
39 India has not signed or ratified the CTBT, and has given no clear signais that it intends to do so. 40 When the CTBT was adopted in September 1996, India objected strongly thal the treaty is "unequal" and perpetuates the "existing global insecurity born ofworld divided unequal!y into nuclear haves and have-nots". 37 "The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization ofindia's Nuclear Doctrine", Indian Government Statement, New Delhi, 4 January 2003, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0301/doc06.htm. 38 Id. The committee reportedly adopted a 1996 draft report on nuclear doctrine by the National Security Advisory Board, availab/e at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india!doctrine/990817-indnucld.htm. However, the reservation of an option for a nuclear response to a biological or chemical attack is not explicitly stated in the draft report. The report had retained flexibility in that and other respects by stating that "the fundamental purpose", and therefore perhaps not the only purpose, "of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces". ithout prejudice to the priority we attach to nuclear disarmament", In dia accepts a Conference on Disarmament pro gram of negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-offTreaty and discussions short ofnegotiations on nuclear disarmament, assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and prevention of an arms race in outer space. 43 28.
India does not release information on its nuclear weapons spending, and it is difficult to reliably estimate such spending. 44 One non-governmental estimate is that India' s nuclear weapons spending in 2010 was U.S. $4.1 billion, and that in 2011, the spending increased to U.S. $4.9 billion_4 In addition to the missiles under development listed above, India is believed to be planning an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Agni VI, and a ground-launched cruise missile 48 
31.
In April 2012, In dia conducted a test-launch of a land based ballistic missile, the Agni V, with a range reportedly greater than 5,000 km, enabling coverage of any target in China.
49 47 Kristensen and Norris, supra, n. 34, p. 100. 48 See Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control:
Modernizing Nuclear Arsenals, Presentation to Short Course on Nuclear Weapons Issues in the 21" Century, Elliot! School oflnternational Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 3 November 2013, slide 15, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publicationsl/Brief2013 _ GWU-APS.pdf.
32.
In January 2013, India conducted its first publicly announced test of a ballistic missile suitable for launch from a submarine. 50 India has had a nuclear-powered submarine for deployment of missiles un der development for more than three decades 5 1 It aims to have a sea based nuclear force in the near future, if it is not already operational, in addition to its land and air based forces. 52 
33.
Regarding air-based Indian nuclear forces, it is reported that in 2012 discussions between India and France began for the purchase by India from France of 126 nuclear-capable Rafale jets, with a tentative delivery date of2016-2017. 53 
34.
India uses plutonium for the explosive core ofnuclear warheads, 54 and continues to add toits stockpile ofweapons-grade plutonium. 55 India currently has one operating plutonium production reactor, and is building another. 56 India is also building a fast -breeder reactor that once operational will significantly increase its capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium. 5 7 India also has a large stockpile ofreactor-grade plutonium that could be used for weapons iflndia so chooses.
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D. India and Nuclear Disarmament
35.
India has notjoined the NPT as an NNWS, the only option open toit under the terms of the Treaty. 59 India further maintains that commitments and calls made in conferences of NPT States Parties do not apply to it, in particular rejecting calls made by NPT States Parties, as weil as the General Assembly and the Security Council, for it to jo in the NPT as an NNWS. 60 However, India has consistently voted for the General Assembly resolution welcoming the Court's conclusion regarding the disarrnament obligation. 61 India states that it has never contributed to the spread of sensitive technologies. 62 It adds that it is updating regulations relating to export controls and taking measures to strengthen nuclear security in accord with international efforts to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors and additional States. Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament 66 The latter resolution caUs for "the urgent commencement of negotiations, in the Conference on Disarrnarnent, for the earl y conclusion of a comprehensive convention" to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. 67 India abstained on the 2012 resolution establishing an Open-Ended Working Group to take forward proposais for multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, 68 but subsequent! y participated in the Working Group.
37.
The first-ever UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament, referenced in the preceding paragraph, was held on 26September 2013, pursuant to a 2012 resolution which was supported by India.
III. THELAW
A.
Article VI of the NPT: An Obligation Erga Omnes
38.
Article VI provides:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arrns race at an early date and to nuclear disarrnament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarrnament under strict and effective international control.
39.
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, the Court declared that Article VI involves "an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear disarrnament in ali its aspects-by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith". 72 The Court went on to conclude, unanimously, that
here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarrnament in ali its aspects under strict and effective control". pp. 273-274: "As the Court has acknowledged, the obligation to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarrnament concerns the 182 orso States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1 think one can go beyond that conclusion and assert that there is in fact a twofold general obligation, opposable erg a omnes, to negotiate in good faith and to achieve the desired result". In its Advisory Opinion, after noting that the twofold obligation in Article VIto pursue and to conclude negotiationsformally concems the (now 190 81 ) States Parties to the NPT, the Court added !hat "any realistic search for general and complete disarrnarnent, especially nuclear disarrnament, necessitates the cooperation of all States".
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43.
In point 2F of the dispositif, moreover, not confining its remarks to the States Parties to the NPT, the Court unanimously declared: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarrnament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". 83 
44.
The Court's declaration is an expression of customary international law as it stands today. All States are under that obligation, therefore. This is consistent with the view expressed by President Bedjaoui in his Declaration: "Indeed, it is not unreasonable to think thal, considering the at !east formai unanimity in this field, this twofold obligation to negotiate in good faith and achieve the desired result has now, 50 years on, acquired a customary character'. follow-up to the Court's opinion, India appears to have accepted the universality ofthat obligation. In operative paragraph one of the resolution, the General Assembly: "Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in ali its aspects under strict and effective international control". 85 
46.
As the Court itself noted, the UN General Assembly has been deeply engaged in working for universal disarmament ofweapons ofmass destruction since its very first resolution in 1946. 86 The UN Security Council a1so has repeatedly called for the implementation of Article VI by al! States, 87 not only Parties to the NPT. In Resolution 1887 of24 September 2009, after calling upon States Parties to the NPT to implement Article VI, the Council called on "ali other States to jo in in this endeavour". 88 The Council has also described the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction as a threat to international peace and security. 89 47.
Regarding the obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date set forth in Article VI, it stands on its own as a customary international law obligation based on the very widespread and representative participation of States in the NPT and is inherent in the custornary international law obligation of nuclear disarmament.
48.
The General Assembly has declared the necessity of cessation of the nuclear arms race. In the Final Document ofits first Special Session on Disarmament, held in 1978, the General Assembly stated that it is "imperative ... to hait and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved". Treaties, 94 it also encapsulates the essence of the Rule of Law in international society 95 and is one of the Princip les of the United Nations.
51.
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter provides: "Ali Members, in order to ensure to ali of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter". The Declaration on Princip les of International Law 1970 makes it clear that this duty applies not only to obligations arising under the Charter but also to those arising "under the generally recognized princip les and ru les of international law" and "und er international agreements valid un der the generally recognized princip les and rules of international law" . 96 
52.
In the Nuclear Tests cases, the I.C.J. declared: "One of the basic princip les governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international cooperation, in 91 In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, ali Statès should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach ta negotiations and the political will ta reach agreements 98 
54.
As set forth above, the customary international law obligation of nuclear disarmament requires both conduct and result: States must not only negotiate in good faith with serions efforts to ac hi eve the elimination of nuclear weapons, but must also actually ac hi eve that result. 99 
55.
The Court has stated that the "princip le of good faith obliges the Parties to apply [a treaty] in a reasonable way and in su ch a mann er that its purpose can be realized".
10°
Con du ct that prevents the fulfilment of a treaty's object and purpose is proscribed. 101 Further, conduct that calls into question a State's commitment to the achievement of agreed objectives undermines the trust necessary for successful cooperation towards the ir achievement. Ali of this applies equally to the obligation to fulfil customary international law obligations in good faith.
IV. OBLIGATIONS BREACHED BY INDIA
56.
Part II of this Application has outlined the facts that are relevant for an assessment of the Respondent's non-compliance with its international obligations with respect to nuclear disarrnament and the cessation of the nuclear arrns race. Part III has outlined the legal basis for this case. The conduct of the Respondent will now be analyzed very briefly in light of the relevant law.
A.
Breach of Customary Iuternatioual Law
Nuclear disarmament
57.
As set forth above, the Court has provided an authoritative analysis of the obligation ofnuclear disarrnament. With respect to Article VI of the NPT, it has held that "the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear disarrnament in al! its aspects -by adopting a particular course of con du ct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith". 103 In the dispositifofits Advisory Opinion the Court concluded unanimously: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarrnament in ali its aspects under strict and effective international contro1". 104 
58.
Although India expressly supports the commencement ofnuclear disarmament negotiations and participated in the Open-Ended Working Group, 105 it has breached this obligation of customary international law by engaging in a course of conduct, the quantitative build-up and qualitative irnprovement of its nuclear forces, contrary to the objective of nuclear disarrnament.
106
Cessation of the nue le ar arms race at an early date
59.
The customary international law obligation of cessation of the nuclear arrns race at an early date is rooted in Article VI of the NPT and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Co un cil and is inherent in the obligation of nuclear disarrnament enunciated by the Court. The Respondent is failing to comply with this obligation; on the contrary, it is engaged in ali-out nuclear arrns racing.
103 Supra, n. 1, para. 99 . 104 Id., para. 105, point 2F. 105 See supra, Part II.D. 106 See supra, Part II.
60.
Its conduct, set forth in Part II of this Application, in quantitatively building up its nuclear forces, qualitatively improving and diversifying them, and planning and preparing to maintain them for the indefinite future, is clear evidence ofindia's ongoing breach of the obligation regarding the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.
B. Breach of the Obligation to Perform Its Obligations in Good Faith
61.
In the previous Section, the Applicant has submitted that the Respondent has breached and continues to breach its obligations tmder customary international law regarding nuclear disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. The Respondent is especially failing to act in good faith as far as its performance ofthose obligations is concerned.
62.
As set forth in Part II of this Application, the Respondent is engaged in the quantitative build-up, diversification, and qualitative improvement of its nuclear arsenal. This constitutes vertical nuclear proliferation that clearly conflicts with the Respondent's obligations ofnuclear disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. It also encourages other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow suit and may induce non-nuclear-weapon States to reconsider their non-nuclear posture.
63.
The Respondent's plans and policies also manifest an intention to rely on its nuclear arsenal for decades to come.
64.
In short, by engaging in conduct that directly conflicts with the obligations of nuclear disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race at an earl y date, the Respondent has breached and continues to breach its legal duty to perform its obligations under customary international law in good faith.
V. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
65.
In accordance w:ith the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, jurisdiction exists byvirtue of the operation of the Declaration of the Marshall Islands dated 15 March 2013 (and deposited 24 April2013) and the Declaration of the Republic oflndia dated 15 Septernber 1974 (and deposited 18 Septernber 1974), each Declaration w:ithout pertinent reservation.
VI. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
66.
Pursuant to Article 31 of the Statute of the Court and Article 35, paragraph 1 of its Ru1es, the Applicant will exercise the power conferred by Article 31 of the Statute and choose a person to sit as judge ad hoc and will so inforrn the Court in due course.
67.
The Applicant reserves the right to rnodify and extend the terrns of this Application, the grounds invoked and the Remedies requested.
REMEDIES
On the basis of the foregoing statement offacts and law, the Republic of the Marshall Islands requests the Court to adjudge and declare a) that India has violated and continues to violate its international obligations under customary international law, by failing to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarrnament in ali its aspects under strict and effective international control, in particular by engaging a course of conduct, the quantitative buildup and qualitative improvement of its nuclear forces, contrary to the objective of nuclear disarmament; b) that India has violated and continues to violate its international obligations un der customary international law with respect to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, by taking actions to quantitatively build up its nuclear forces, to qualitatively improve them, and to maintain them for the indefinite future; c) that In dia has failed and continues to fail to perforrn in good faith its obligations under customary international law by taking actions to quantitatively build up its nuclear forces, to qualitatively improve them, and to rnaintain them for the indefinite future; and d) that India has failed and continues to fail to perforrn in good faith its obligations under custoinary international law by effectively preventing the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States from fulfilling their part of the obligations under customary international law and Article VI of the NPT with respect to nuclear disarrnarnent and cessation of the nuclear arros race at an earl y date.
In addition, the Republic of the Marshall Islands requests the Court
to order
India to take ali steps necessary to comply with its obligations under customary international law with respect to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an earl y date and nuclear disarmament within one year of the Judgment, including the pursuit, by initiation if necessary, of negotiations in good faith aimed at the conclusion of a convention on nuclear disarmament in ali its aspects under strict and effective international control.
DATED this 24'h of April2014
Tony A. 
